ABSTRACT We propose a new scheme to secure a wireless-powered untrusted cooperative-communication network, where a legitimate source node (Alice) transmits her information messages to a legitimate destination node (Bob) through the multiple amplify-and-forward untrusted relays. The relay nodes are assumed to be honest but curious nodes; hence, they are trusted at the service level but are untrusted at the information level. To reduce the energy consumption of the network, only one relay node is selected in each time slot to forward Alice's information signal. We assume a power-splitting-based energy-harvesting scheme, where each relay node splits its received signal into information and energy streams. Since the relay nodes are assumed to be untrusted at the information level, they attempt to decode the information intended to Bob while harvesting energy at the same time. When the relaying mode is selected, the scheme is realized over two non-overlapping time phases. To prevent any information leakage to the untrusted relay nodes, Bob and a cooperative jammer (John) inject jamming (artificial noise) signals during the first phase. During the second phase, the untrusted relay nodes that will not be forwarding the information signal must harvest energy to accumulate more energy to help Alice in future time slots. Moreover, the cooperative jammer will jam the untrusted relays to further power their batteries and prevent them from decoding the information-forwarding relay signal in case they decided to cheat and decode it. We model the battery state transitions at each relay as a finite-state Markov chain and analyze it. Our numerical results show the security gains of our proposed scheme relative to two benchmark schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency (RF) energy-harvesting (EH) schemes have gained increased interest recently as a promising solution to energize the battery-based wireless communication nodes in a wireless communication network [1] . Under the RF-EH paradigm, the wireless nodes convert the ambient RF transmissions into a direct current (DC) electricity. This prolongs their battery lifetimes with self-sufficient energy supply. Since RF transmissions can simultaneously carry both information and energy, an EH node is capable of decoding the information in a signal and converting a portion of that signal into energy. This motivates simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) [2] .
The efficiency of RF-EH schemes is a function of many parameters including the network topology as mentioned in, e.g., [3] and the references therein. In particular, due to channel randomness, where the channel gain can be low for some times and high for other times, and its monotonically-decreasing behavior with distance, only wireless nodes that are relatively close to the transmitting nodes (e.g., base-stations or uplink users) can benefit from the energy carried over the RF transmissions. These wireless nodes do not only collect more wireless energy during the downlink (DL) phase but also use less transmit power during the uplink (UL) phase as well. In contrast, the nodes that are distant from the base-station will harvest less energy and will have to use more transmit powers during the uplink phases. Hence, it is necessary to have cooperative relay nodes in the middle between the base-station and the legitimate users to mitigate the channel fading effects and increase both information transmission and energy transfer rates. SWIPT schemes provide new opportunities for wireless-powered cooperative communications (WPCC), where the relays (which can be other legitimate entities/users in the network) are able to cooperate with the source node more frequently since they do not use their own energies [4] . In this energy-efficient system design, the wireless relays are solely depending on the energy collected from the RF transmissions to aid the source nodes.
Using SWIPT schemes, the relay nodes divide their received signals into two distinct streams. A stream that will be passed to the EH circuitry and the other stream will be used for data processing and information forwarding. The two most efficient relaying schemes proposed in the SWIPT literature are: 1) the time-switching relaying (TSR) where the time is orthogonally-divided between EH and information-decoding tasks [5] ; and 2) the power-splitting relaying (PSR) where the signal splitting is performed in the power domain using a power splitter [5] . Chen et al. [6] investigated the PSR scheme in the multiple-user multiple-relay systems. Nasir et al. [7] investigated the relay interference channels [7] . Since the amount of harvested energy in a single-transmission period is small, the performance of the relayed transmissions is low. Hence, extensive research efforts have been directed to developing the harvest-store-use (HSU) scheme. In particular, instead of using the entire energy harvested in one transmission cycle, the harvested energy is first accumulated and stored in a battery for a while and then adaptively used for information transmissions [8] - [10] . In the TSR scheme, the relay nodes switch between EH and information forwarding from one transmission cycle to another. Under HSU-WPC schemes, the EH nodes use several EH blocks to accumulate enough energy for information transmissions. Hence, the reliability and secrecy of WPCC are enhanced with the minimum energy consumption [11] .
A. RELATED WORKS
Since the EH relays are solely powered by the energy of the RF transmissions, in WPCC networks, the relays may not always be ready to help since the energy harvested is often much smaller than that required for data transmissions. Hence, the HSU approach is a promising solution to stabilize the energy supply for information transmissions over time. Nasir et al. [8] considered energy accumulation for a two-hop system with one relay node, where the relay first stores energy in an infinite energy-storage battery and starts the information forwarding mode as soon as it harvests enough energy to transmit with a constant predetermined transmit power. Krikidis et al. [9] assumed a finite energy storage at the relay node and proposed a greedy-switching scheme where the relay node transmits when its residual energy ensures reliable decoding at the destination node. Hence, the reception reliability and energy consumption are simultaneously improved. In practice, a set of relays should be deployed between the source and its destination to enhance both reliability and security by introducing diversity to mitigate channel fading.
Relay-selection schemes enhance the energy-efficiency and system's performance by selecting the best relay (or set of relays) for information forwarding [12] , [13] . When the relay nodes are equipped with energy-storage batteries, the design of relay-selection schemes in WPCC systems differs from conventional cooperative networks where all nodes have reliable power supplies. In fact, the relay-selection criteria must take into consideration both available energy at the relays and the required information rate. Therefore, battery-aware relay-selection (BARS) schemes were proposed in [14] - [16] to improve the reliability of the multi-relay WPCC networks by exploiting both channel state information (CSI) and battery state information (BSI) to make the relay-selection decisions. In the BARS schemes, the relay nodes with battery energy levels exceeding a predetermined threshold required for information transmission will first form a subset, since not all relays will have the same energy level, then feedback their CSI to the source node. Afterwards, the source node selects the best relay among the subset of candidate relays to forward its information signal to the destination node. While the selected relay node decodes the source information signal, the remaining relay nodes scavenge energy from the source signal. Krikidis [17] investigated various relay-selection schemes for WPCC systems with multiple randomly-distributed relay nodes. The EH relay nodes help the source's transmission only when their batteries are full. Liu [14] assumed that each relay node accumulates a minimum energy level to be a candidate for selection. Then, each of the candidate relay nodes sends its CSI. These works assume finite-size batteries at the EH relay nodes which switch between energy harvesting and information forwarding from one coherence time (i.e., transmission block) to another.
Although the broadcast nature of wireless channels helps in energy transfer to many nodes at the same time, wireless channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks and, hence, the confidentiality of data transmissions can be compromised. This is because any node with an RF transceiver can overhear the ongoing communications in a wireless network and, possibly, determine the identity of the communicating nodes. Secure communications in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) SWIPT systems were investigated in [18] where the source node splits its transmit power to send confidential messages to the information receiver and an artificial noise (AN) signal to prevent the energy receivers from eavesdropping the information. In this context, most existing research work has focused on the use of cooperative jamming (CJ) schemes to secure the WPCC systems [19] - [23] . In [19] - [22] , the jammers harvest energy from the source node and then use the harvested energy to perform CJ. In [24] , the secrecy of an EH relay network is improved by using the commonly-used destination-based jamming (DBJ) scheme where the destination node sends AN signals to confuse the eavesdropper. The generated AN signal by the destination also serves as a new source of RF energy to be harvested by the EH nodes [23] .
Sun et al. [25] showed that CJ enables secure two-hop communications through an untrusted relay which could be otherwise not possible. Kalamkar and Banerjee investigated the security of the wireless-powered untrusted cooperative communication (WPUCC) where the relay nodes eavesdrop on the legitimate transmissions although they are cooperating in forwarding the source's information. The authors showed that the secrecy performance is improved when the relay node is located closer to the destination. A sufficient and necessary condition for obtaining a positive secrecy rate for an RF-EH untrusted cooperative PSR scheme was derived in [27] . Mabrouk et al. [28] proposed a scheme to secure relay-aided transmissions when the relay is untrusted and in the presence of alien eavesdropping attacks. Wang et al. [29] proposed a secure communication scheme for untrusted two-way relaying systems. Zhao et al. [30] proposed a joint power-splitting and secure beamforming design. It was shown in [31] that, if there is a direct link between the source and its destination, the deployment of untrusted relays in the network will be useless when the target secrecy rate is large.
Although the BARS schemes have been investigated widely in the non-eavesdropping scenarios, energy accumulation under a secrecy constraint has not been well-investigated yet. In most existing work, the HSU model is investigated where information relaying is performed when enough energy is accumulated through the time-switching scheme. Zhou et al. [10] , Yuan et al. [32] , and Liu et al. [33] investigated energy accumulation in PSR-based systems where information transmission and energy transfer are employed simultaneously. This approach is called the harvest-use-store (HUS) scheme. Unlike the HSU scheme, in the HUS scheme, the expenditure of the collected energy is prioritized by information transmission and the remaining harvested energy will be stored in the nodes' batteries for future use. Zhou et al. [10] proposed the HUS relaying strategy with distributed beamforming in wirelessly-powered multiple-relay scenarios. Liu et al. [33] investigated the HUS scheme in a full-duplex relay network where the relay switches between two rechargeable batteries for charging and discharging during two consecutive communication cycles. Mabrouk et al. [34] proposed a relay-selection scheme for untrusted-relay networks when the source node transmits a jamming signal that is previously shared with the destination node. The assumption of previously shared jamming/AN signals might not always be possible. Unlike [34] , we propose a new secure scheme when the destination transmits a jamming signal and in the presence of a cooperative jammer that helps in both powering and jamming the untrusted EH-RF relay nodes.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
Motivated by the above work, we propose a joint DBJ and CJ scheme to reduce the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the WPUCC systems under untrusted relaying. Moreover, since the untrusted relays have batteries to accumulate the RF harvested energy, they will be able to better serve the source node in forwarding its data to the destination. The relay that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate is selected in each time slot. Bao and Cuu [35] investigate a distributed switch-and-stay combining technique to secure a dual-hop relay network where the destination switches to and stays with either the direct link or the relaying link. In [36] , based on the CSI estimate, the source performs DL information transmission either directly or cooperatively with the relay. Apart from recovering some of the spectral loss inherent to half-duplex cooperative relaying, the proposed scheme reduces energy constraints on the relay nodes so as to increase their batteries' lifetimes.
We propose a new jamming-based scheme to secure the transmissions in wireless-powered untrusted relay networks. The proposed scheme exploits both the CSI of the wireless links and the energy-state information (ESI) of the relays' batteries. Our contributions are summarized as follows
• Considering the energy constraint at the untrusted relay nodes, we design a new scheme to secure the transmissions from Alice to Bob where only a subset of the relays will be active during a time slot and only one relay is selected for information forwarding to reduce the energy expenditure in the network.
• Under the practical assumption of finite-capacity energy storage at the untrusted RF-EH relays, we analyze the dynamic behaviors of the relays' batteries by modelling each battery as a finite-state Markov chain. We derive closed-form expressions for the steady-state distributions. In addition, we analyze the instantaneous secrecy rate and the SOP of the system under the proposed scheme. Notation: Unless otherwise stated, lower-and upper-case bold letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. F x (y) = Pr{x ≤ y} denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF). C M ×N denotes the set of all complex matrices of size M × N . (·) and (·) * denote transpose and Hermitian (i.e., complex-conjugate transpose) operations, respectively. | · | cardinality of a set. E{·} denotes statistical expectation. 0 M ×N denotes the all-zero matrix with size M × N . θ = 1 − θ. diag = {·} denotes a diagonal matrix with the enclosed elements as its diagonal elements.
[·] + = max{0, ·} returns the maximum between the argument and zero. A list of the key variables is given in Table 1 .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURE PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We investigate a WPCC network composed of a half-duplex source node, Alice, that communicates with a half-duplex legitimate destination node, Bob, through a cluster of VOLUME 5, 2017 K untrusted amplify-and-forward (AF) half-duplex relay nodes 1 ({r k } K k=1 ) in the presence of a cooperative half-duplex jamming node, John, as shown in Fig. 1 . We consider that each relay is an EH node and equipped with an RF-EH circuitry with a finite-storage rechargeable battery whose capacity is E max energy units. We assume that the relay nodes employ a PSR scheme and they can accumulate the harvested energy from the ambient RF transmissions before relaying the information to Bob. Alice, Bob, and the relays are equipped with a single antenna. However, John is equipped with N J antennas.
The channel coefficient between node i and node j, where i ∈ {a, J , r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r K } and j ∈ {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r K , b}, is denoted by h i,j . We assume a flat-fading channel model where a channel coefficient remains fixed for the duration of one transmission block of length T and changes independently from one transmission time to another. If the wireless channels exhibit Rayleigh fading, the channel gain g i,j |h i,j | 2 is distributed as an exponential random variable with mean D −β ij , where D ij is the Euclidean distance between node i and node j and β is the path-loss exponent. The thermal noise at a receiving node is modeled as an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance. For clarity, we define i,j = g i,j P i where P i is the transmit power at node i.
A. WIRETAP CODE DESIGN
The random binning scheme is used to secure the transmissions [40] . Consider the scenario where Alice transmits her information packets to Bob without the aid of the relay nodes. In a given time slot, Alice adaptively selects her transmission rate to be close to the instantaneous rate of the Alice-Bob link such that no outage events occur. Alice uses a codebook C(2 nR A−B , 2 nR s , n) where R A−B is the instantaneous rate of the Alice-Bob link and R s is the target secrecy rate (i.e., number of information bits per channel use), n is the codeword length, 2 nR A−B is the number of codewords in the codebook, and 2 nR s is the number of confidential information messages to transmit. The 2 nR A−B codewords are randomly grouped into 2 nR s bins. To transmit a confidential message w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR s }, Alice adopts a stochastic encoder to randomly select a codeword from bin w and transmit it over the wireless channel. In our scenario where the information is transmitted as a packet, the encoder will set a constant value for the target secrecy rate R s . When Alice's transmission is aided with one of the relay nodes, the same coding will be used but with the relevant transmission rate (i.e., the codebook rate will be the rate of the end-to-end transmission as will be shown shortly).
Since the information messages are transmitted at a fixed rate, there are two types of outage events 1) Connection outage: This outage event occurs when the instantaneous rate of the channel is below the target secrecy rate R s . 2) Secrecy rate outage: This outage event occurs when the instantaneous secrecy rate of channel is below the target secrecy rate R s .
B. TRANSMISSION MODEL
Since the two communication hops are intercepted by the untrusted relays, the DBJ in addition to the CJ scheme is adopted to protect the source's confidential information.
Since the destination (Bob) generates the AN signal, he can cancel it prior to information decoding but the untrusted relays cannot. Similarly, we assume that the jammer designs its AN precoding matrix in such a way that it only affects the relay node that will not forward Alice's information. Hence, the jamming signal by John will not affect the relay selected for information forwarding or Bob. The precoding matrix at John for the various transmission modes and time phases are carefully designed in the next subsection. The untrusted relay nodes are assumed to be non-colluding which means that they intercept the information independently. Alice, Bob, and John are assumed to be equipped with reliable power supplies and transmit at a constant transmit power levels P a , P b , and P J , respectively. On the other hand, the untrusted relays are assumed to be low-cost nodes with RF-EH capability and they are solely powered by the ambient RF transmissions from the legitimate nodes. Hence, the additional data rate that will be achieved in the system due to the presence of the relays is attained with no extra power. A relay node that has stored (accumulated) enough wireless energy to transmit at the required power level P • is referred to as an active relay. The set of relays that have accumulated the required energy are referred to as the active relays. The relay nodes will try to eavesdrop on the ongoing transmissions from Alice. Hence, using the PSR protocol, the relay nodes perform information decoding and energy harvesting simultaneously. We assume that all relay nodes adopt the same power-splitting factor with energy-conversion efficiency 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. The power-splitting ratios for information processing (decoding or forwarding) and energy harvesting are denoted as ρ = 1 − ρ and ρ, respectively.
In our proposed protocol, instead of relaying all the packets, a selected relay is used only to forward the information packets for which the transmission through the direct link (Alice-Bob link) is not secure (i.e., cannot securely support the target secrecy rate R s ). To realize this scheme, based on the success/failure of the direct transmission, Alice selects to either directly communicate with Bob or communicate through only one of the untrusted relays. If the instantaneous secrecy rate from Alice to Bob lies above a target secrecy rate R s , 2 the direct single-hop transmission (DSHT) mode is selected otherwise the cooperative relay dual-hop transmission (RDHT) mode is selected. If the transmission is unsecured under both modes, the system is in secrecy outage and all nodes will remain idle.
In our proposed scheme, full CSI of the communication links should be available at the central unit which can be either Alice or Bob. Prior to information signal transmission, a two-phase training is used to acquire the instantaneous CSI of all links at Alice which will be used for transmission mode selection. In the first phase, Alice estimates the CSI corresponding to the Alice-Bob link, which can be achieved by using pilot signaling from Bob. The relay nodes and John also use the pilot signal to estimate their channel coefficients to Bob. Then, each relay node sends a one-symbol pilot signal (a deterministic known pilot signal transmitted over one symbol duration) so that Alice, Bob and John estimate their CSI to the relays. To make the channel estimation more accurate, a set of pilot symbols can be transmitted by each node instead of a single pilot symbol. The channels are then fed back to Alice to decide on the selected mode. If the RDHT mode is selected, Alice broadcasts the index of the relay selected for information forwarding to notify all the relay nodes, Bob, and John about the relay-selection process completion.
The transmission time (i.e., time slot) is divided into two time subslots of equal duration T 2 . If the direct link is secure, the DSHT mode is selected and the two time subslots will be utilized by Alice to send the confidential information to Bob directly. If this mode is not secured, the RDHT mode is selected and one of the relays will be selected to forward the Alice's transmission. Our proposed scheme as shown in Fig. 2 
is summarized as follows
• If the DSHT mode is selected, Alice broadcasts her information to Bob and the relays. All relays listen to the transmitted information over the entire time slot duration, and as mentioned earlier, they adopt the power-splitting scheme to simultaneously process the information and harvest energy. Simultaneously, John injects a jamming signal to degrade the channels of all relays but not Bob's channel to prevent causing any interference at Bob's receiver. Hence, the jamming signals are injected to only degrade the untrusted relays' channels. • If the RDHT mode is selected, the transmission occurs over two time subslots as follows.
-Assume that relay r is selected for information forwarding. During the first time subslot, similar to the DSHT mode, Alice broadcasts her information to Bob and the relays. However, at the same time, Bob injects a jamming signal to hurt all the relays while John injects a jamming signal to hurt all relays except the information forwarding relay (relay ) to prevent causing any interference at Bob when that relay forwards Alice's signal. 3 -During the second time subslot, if at least one of the relay nodes is active (i.e., has energy more than P • T /2), this active relay will transmit an amplified-version of Alice's transmission. Simultaneously, John injects a jamming signal orthogonal to the direction of the channel vector of his link to Bob to avoid interfering with Bob while interfering with all relays (including relay r ). This jamming signal is important to i) further power the relay nodes; and ii) due to their malicious behavior, the relays may eavesdrop the information-forwarding relay's signal. By using this jamming signal, the received signal will have very low signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) and it will be useless for the relays. Hence, they cannot combine the received signals from Alice or the information-forwarding relay. Accordingly, the non-selected relay nodes will use the entire received signal from the information-forwarding relay for energy harvesting (i.e., they set ρ = 1). During the RDHT mode, we have two time subslots. Hence, in the κ-th time subslot of transmission, κ ∈ {1, 2}, we denote the AWGN due to signal processing at receiver j by n (κ) j . As assumed in most of the SWIPT literature, the contribution of the antenna noise at relay r k , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }, is very small (and negligible). When the 3 If the selected relay forwards John's jamming signal, the jamming signal will degrade Bob's receiver.
DSHT mode is used, the superscript κ in n (κ) j is omitted. In the following, we provide the details of the proposed transmission modes.
1) DSHT MODE
If direct transmission is secured (i.e., the instantaneous secrecy rate is higher than the target secrecy rate), it is useless and energy-inefficient to get any help from the untrusted relay nodes. Hence, Alice uses the entire time slot, T , for direct transmissions to Bob. At the same time, the relay nodes should harvest Alice's signal energy to accumulate more energy in their batteries, but since they are untrusted, they might eavesdrop on the confidential information. To prevent information leakage in such eavesdropping attacks, while Alice transmits her information signal, x, to Bob with transmit power level P a , John transmits a jamming signal vector z J with transmit power level P J , where x and the elements of z J are zero-mean circularly-symmetric random variables with unit variances. Hence, the received signal at Bob is given by
where h J ,b ∈ C 1×N J is the channel vector of the John-Bob link and
is the AN signal vector transmitted by John. John selects his AN-precoding matrix, denoted by U 1 , to be canceled at Bob during the DSHT transmission. Hence, U 1 is designed such that
where U 1 is the AN precoding matrix which should be orthonormal column to maintain the average transmit power fixed. 4 On the other hand, the relays have no knowledge about the jamming signal. Thus, the received RF signal at the input of relay r k is expressed as
where h J ,r k ∈ C 1×N J is the channel vector of the link between John and relay r k , and
is the AN-precoding matrix used at John. The relay nodes are assumed to be eavesdroppers that attempt to decode 4 To obtain an orthonormal-column matrix U 1 , the singular value decomposition method can be used to obtain the solution of is not orthonormal-column matrix but it does not change the transmit power due to the normalization factor √ Tr{WW * }.
the messages transmitted from Alice. Hence, based on the adopted power-splitting EH scheme, each relay node r k splits the received signal into two streams: √ ρy a,r k for harvesting energy and √ ρy a,r k for decoding the information signal. Similar to the literature, we ignore the harvested energy from the antenna noise [26] . Hence, the received signal to be used for information processing at relay r k can be expressed as
Based on (4), the instantaneous SINR at relay r k is given by
Hence, when the DSHT mode is used, the achievable secrecy rate is given by
Since Alice sends her information signal over the time slot duration, the harvested energy at the relay nodes during the DSHT mode is E k h,DSHT , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }, where
2) RDHT MODE when the DSHT mode cannot satisfy the target secrecy rate requirement, the RDHT mode is selected where Alice transmits the information signal √ P a x, during the first time subslot, while all the relay nodes listen. Bob and John start to send jamming signals to confuse the relays where Bob sends the jamming signal to confuse all the relays while John sends a jamming signal to confuse all the relays except the one that will forward the data signal since jamming that information-forwarding relay will also jam Bob when he receives the jammed signal. In the first time subslot, the received signal at relay r k is given by
where z b is Bob's jamming signal which is modeled as a zero-mean circularly-symmetric random variable with unit variance, and U 2 z J is John's jamming signal vector during the first subslot.
The received signal to be used for information processing at relay r k can be expressed as
To avoid forwarding the AN signal by the selected relay at Bob, the jammer should cancel the AN at the relay selected for information forwarding. Hence, the AN precoding matrix during the first phase of the time slot is given by
From (9), the instantaneous SINR at relay r k is given by
When k = , since h J ,r U 2 2 = 0 from (10), we have
The amount of harvested energy at all relays except the relay selected during the first time subslot of the RDHT mode is given by
The energy harvested at the selected relay for information forwarding is given by
In the second time subslot, only one active relay r (if any) amplifies the received signal from Alice, √ ρy a,r , by multiplying it with a weighting gain G = P ρP a g a,r +ρP b g b,r +1 and forwards the resultant signal to Bob. The forwarded signal from the selected relay is given by
Since Bob knows the AN that he generated, he cancels it from the received signal prior to information decoding. Hence, the received signal at Bob, after removing his jamming signal z b , is given by
b . (16) The unselected relays (r k (k = )) can intercept the transmission during the second time subslot. The received signal at r k is given by
The purpose of the jamming signal from John during the second time subslot, given by ρ P J N J −1 h J ,r k U 1 z J , is to energize the relays for future transmissions and prevent them from performing maximal ratio combining. It is noteworthy that the precoder during the second time subslot of the RDHT mode is designed as in the DSHT mode since John can jam everywhere except the John-Bob vector direction.
In the RDHT mode, the non-selected relay nodes may attempt to eavesdrop on the transmission during the VOLUME 5, 2017 second hop. Hence, they may combine the signals over the two time subslots (signal from Alice and from the information-forwarding relay) to decode Alice's information signal more reliably. However, since the selected relay uses an AF relaying scheme, combining the two received signals at the non-selected relays will not help in decoding the confidential information since the AN signals from both Bob and John and the additional relayed AWGN samples from the information-forwarding relay will significantly degrade the signal received over the second time subslot at the non-selected relays. In addition, John will also jam the second time subslot to further prevent the untrusted relays from eavesdropping and to further energize them. In other words, securing the Alice-relay transmissions is enough to ensure the security of the entire two-hop transmission since the relayed signal by the information-forwarding relay is actually the received signal from Alice (which is degraded by the jamming signal from Bob) in addition to the AWGN signal (due to signal processing at the selected relay) and the jamming signal from John. Hence, the received signal during the second subslot at the non-selected relays will be very weak for data decoding but is a good signal for accumulating more energy at the relays. In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the relays should collect as much energy as they can during the second time subslot to be able to help Alice in future time slots. Furthermore, as in the untrusted relaying literature [26] , [27] , [29] - [31] , the relays nodes are assumed to be honest and trusted at the service level and untrusted at the information level. Hence, they should obey the legitimate system and follow the orders. Consequently, during the second time subslot of the RDHT mode, the non-selected relay nodes will harvest energy.
When the RDHT mode is used, the instantaneous secrecy rate is given by 
denotes the received SNR at Bob from the signal received from the selected relay. The secrecy rate is reduced by a factor of two since Alice uses just half the time slot to transmit the same information. When the DSHT mode is insecure, the K relay nodes harvest energy from Alice's information transmission and John's jamming signal in the first time subslot. In the second time subslot, the selected relay node amplifies-and-forwards the received signal to Bob while the other relay nodes use the entire subslot duration to harvest energy with ρ = 1 from both the selected relay's transmission and the jamming signal transmission from John. Hence, the harvested energy at r k (k = ) during the second time subslot is given by
If the direct link is in secrecy outage and cannot support the target secrecy rate, the amount of harvested energy at the relay nodes r and r k (k = ) are given by E h, 1 and
, respectively. If none of the relay nodes had accumulated sufficient energy to transmit, Alice and the relay nodes remain silent and the overall system is in outage.
C. RELAY SELECTION SCHEME
We propose a two-step relay selection scheme which is based on both the CSI of the wireless links and the ESI of the batteries at the relay nodes. In the first step, based on the ESI at batteries, only a subset with cardinality | | ≤ K of the relay nodes will be active. This active subset is representing the subset of the relays that can aid Alice. The subset is constructed as
where E 0,k denotes the ESI of relay r k at the beginning of the time slot. In the second step, the relay node in with the highest secrecy rate is selected. That is, r is selected as
To ensure a secure transmission (i.e., perfect information secrecy), R RDHT s,k ≥ R s . Otherwise, the secrecy is compromised. If the best relay secrecy rate cannot guarantee the R s bits/sec/Hz, then all other active relays cannot guarantee it. Hence, the system is in secrecy outage. If none of the active relays in set satisfy R RDHT s,k ≥ R s , we define I = 0 which implies that there is no relaying and all nodes will be idle.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. ENERGY STORAGE MODEL
To analyze the performance of our proposed scheme, we characterize the dynamic behaviors of the relays' batteries. Since we assume a cluster of relay nodes, the DSHT mode corresponds to an increase of the battery energy levels for all relays with the same average amount of energy. When the RDHT mode is used, the first time subslot corresponds to an increase of the battery energy levels for all relays with different amounts of average energy. In the second time subslot, the battery energy level of the selected relay for information forwarding may decrease. Hence, the energy-accumulation process at the relay nodes depends on both the channel condition of the Alice-Bob link and their own energy storage levels. The probability of secure transmission from Alice to Bob without relaying is given by
If both the DSHT mode and the RDHT mode are not secure, Alice and the selected relay should not send any information signals. Moreover, John and Bob remain idle and do not send jamming signals. Hence, relay nodes are only used when the RDHT mode satisfies the target secrecy rate.
In wireless networks, due to the time-varying channel conditions, the RF-EH rates at the EH nodes are randomly fluctuating over time. Moreover, the selected relay for information forwarding varies from one coherence time (time slot) to another. Based on these two facts, the batteries' state transitions are modeled as a discrete-time finite-state Markov chain (MC) that evolves on a finite state space S = {ψ 0 , . . . , ψ L }, where L denotes the number of discrete energy levels. We define ψ i as the state when the relay's residual energy in its battery is
Thus, during the n-th time subslot, when the RDHT mode is used, the discretized amount of the harvested energy for relay r k is given by
where · is the floor function. The total energy accumulated over the two subslots during the RDHT mode is given by
The amount of energy harvested during the DSHT mode is
When the RDHT mode is used, the discretized value of the transmission energy at the selected relay in the second time subslot is given by
where · is the ceiling function. Let E m 0,k denote the battery energy level of the k-th relay at the beginning of the m-th transmission time slot and assume that relay is selected. Then, according to the proposed scheme, the battery energy level at the end of the m-th time slot (or at the beginning of the (m+1)-th time slot), denoted by E m+1 0,k , is given by (27) at the top of the next page where 1 [·] denotes an indicator function that equals one if its argument is true and zero otherwise.
A relay node is a candidate for selection if, in the beginning of a time slot, its battery energy level exceeds δ t . Let ζ k i denote an indicator which is equal to one if the i-th battery energy level of the k-th relay is higher than the energy level required for information forwarding, δ i ≥ δ t , and zero otherwise. On the other hand, the state transition may occur between the two consecutive time slots. Hence, the transition probabilities of the MC are time dependent and the MC is considered as a time non-homogeneous. In this case, a standard MC cannot capture the heterogeneity in battery energy level evolution over the two transmission phases. If the current battery state of the k-th relay node is ψ i , it transits to state ψ l at the first time subslot with probability p (1) k, (i,l) , then to state ψ j in the second time subslot with probability p (2) k, (l,j) . Based on the Markov property, the transitions ψ i → ψ l and ψ l → ψ j are independent events. Hence, we split the state transition process into two stages and construct two independent transition probability matrices (X (1) k and X (2) k ), one for each stage, where the transition probability matrix is defined as X
To decouple the interaction among the relays' batteries, we assume while solving the MCs that a relay loses δ t energy units when the relay is selected for relaying, which occurs with probability 1/K since the relays are located in a cluster, the relay is active (i.e., its battery level is higher than δ t ), and the relaying link is secured (i.e., its secrecy rate is at least equal to the target secrecy rate R s bits/sec/Hz). Moreover, a transmission occurs under the RDHT mode when the selected relaying link can securely support the target secrecy rate. Hence, these approximations underestimate the performance of our proposed scheme. Let π (n) i , i = 0, . . . , L, be the steady-state probability of being in the i-th state after the n-th time subslot of the transmission block at the k-th relay. The channels in the network are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Hence, all relay nodes have the same transition matrices, and then identical stationary distribution for all relay nodes. Hereinafter, unless necessary, we will omit the index k.
1) FIRST TIME SUBSLOT ANALYSIS
Regardless of the used transmission mode, the first phase implies an increase in the relays' batteries energy levels only. In the DSHT mode, all the relays' batteries energy levels increase with the same average amount of energy. However, in the RDHT mode, the non-selected relays will harvest more energy than the selected one because they will receive the jamming signal from John. Assuming that relays are in a cluster, each active relay has an equal chance to be selected with a probability given by 1 | | , where | | is the cardinality of . As a function of the cardinality of the active set, this probability is time-dependent. On the other hand, the stationary distribution of each relay battery status is time-independent. Alternatively, we use the lower-bound 1 K . We summarize all the transition probabilities into the following four general cases.
1) The battery remains unchanged (
The battery remains unchanged if, during the first time subslot, the discretized amount of harvested energy from either the DSHT mode or the RDHT mode is less than one energy level, δ 1 . The transition VOLUME 5, 2017
probability is thus given by
where
≥ R s which is independent of the index k since the relays are located in a cluster.
2) The battery remains fully charged (ψ L → ψ L ):
Under the practical assumption of finite-capacity energy storage at the untrusted RF-EH relays, any received energy that overflows their capacity E max cannot be stored and the extra energy will be lost. Hence, ψ L is an absorbing state and the transition probability from state ψ L to itself is given by
3) The battery is partially charged (ψ i → ψ j with 0 ≤ i ≤ j < L): When the battery is not full, (i.e., δ i < δ L ), a non-zero discretized harvested energy less than δ L − δ i will lead to an increase of the battery to an intermediate level j. The transition probability ψ i → ψ j is given by
4) The non-full battery is fully charged (
In this case, a non-zero discretized harvested energy higher than δ L − δ i fully charges the battery. The state transition probability from level i to level L is given by
Since there is no energy expenditure in the first time subslot, only the transitions involving an increase in the battery energy level can occur. Therefore, the transition matrix X (1) is upper triangular.
2) SECOND TIME SUBSLOT ANALYSIS
During the second time subslot, a relay's battery level can decrease by δ t energy units only when the RDHT mode is activated and the relay was selected to retransmit Alice's transmission to Bob. Otherwise, the relay's battery can either increase or remain unchanged. In fact, if the DSHT mode is activated, the source continues its transmission while all the relays harvest. On the other hand, if the RDHT is activated, the non-selected relay nodes accumulate further energy in their batteries for future use. In the following, to compute the state distribution of the considered Markov model, we first find the state transition probabilities for the second time subslot.
1) The battery remains unchanged (
The battery remains unchanged if the relay is harvesting energy during the second subslot. However, the harvested energy is low and incapable of powering the relay's battery. In this case, the transition probability from state ψ i to state ψ i is given by
2) The battery remains fully charged (ψ L → ψ L ): When the relay's battery is full, an overflow event occurs if either the DSHT mode is activated or the relay is not selected for information forwarding when the RDHT mode is activated. Hence, the transition probability is given by
3) The battery is partially charged (ψ i → ψ j with
If the relay harvests a non-zero discretized amount of energy that is less than δ L −δ i , the battery energy level increase from energy level i to an intermediate energy level j with a transition probability given by
4) The non-full battery is fully charged (ψ i → ψ L with 0 ≤ i < L): The relay's battery is fully charged with a probability given by
5) The non-empty battery is discharged (ψ i → ψ j with
If the relay is selected for information forwarding, which occurs with probability 1/K when the relays are clustered, the relay's battery is reduced by δ t energy units. Hence, the transition probability is given by
Based on the Chapman-Kolmogorov identity [41] , [42] , 5 the two-stage transition probabilities are given by
It turns out that in general, computing X is accomplished via matrix multiplication
Since the MC is finite-state, irreducible, and aperiodic, all states are positive recurrent and ergodic. 6 The steady-state distribution vector for the proposed protocol at an arbitrary relay is computed by calculating higher powers of the matrix as follows [42] π π π = π π π
where π π π is the steady-state distribution with its i-th element as the probability that the battery is in state i, denoted by π i , and π π π 0 is any initial steady-state distribution [42] .
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY (SOP)
In our proposed scheme, whenever the target secrecy rate R s is not satisfied under the DSHT mode, the relay nodes are involved to achieve the target secrecy rate through cooperative diversity. Hence, the communications system is in outage if the instantaneous secrecy rates of both DSHT mode and RDHT mode fall below the target secrecy rate, R s bits/sec/Hz. Consequently, an outage event may occur if (1) the instantaneous secrecy rate of the Alice-Bob link without relaying fails to achieve the target secrecy rate, and (2) when the active-relay set, , is empty or the transmission from the 5 The transition matrix at time t +s, denoted by P(t +s), is equal to P(t)P(s). 6 An MC is said to be irreducible if and only if all states communicate [43] . Moreover, an MC is said to be aperiodic if all states are aperiodic; a state is aperiodic if and only if there exists a time t such that π selected relay fails to achieve the target secrecy R s . Hence, the SOP of the system is given by
R s is the probability that the instantaneous secrecy rate is lower than the target secrecy rate given that there are k = | | active relays. It is noteworthy that since the relays are in a cluster, the probability P k sec is only a function of the number of active relays.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the analytical findings are verified through simulations. In addition, we provide the performance comparison between DSHT-only mode, RDHT-only mode, and the proposed scheme and investigate the impact of the system parameters on their SOPs. Without loss of generality, we consider a normalized relay network in a square of unit area, where all distances are normalized. The coordinates of the source (Alice) s the destination (Bob) d and the jammer (John) J are are (0, 0.5), (1, 0.5) and (0.5,0.6), respectively. The untrusted relay nodes in the network are grouped into a cluster and thus they have the same coordinate (0.5,0.5). Unless otherwise stated, we set the simulation parameters as follows: energy harvesting efficiency η = 0.6, path loss exponent β = 3, the number of antennas at the jammer is N J = 4 and P b = P J = P r = 15 dBm. The power splitting factor is ρ = 0.5. Each channel coefficient between any antenna pair is assumed to be a complex zero-mean circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variable with unit variance. For simplicity, all the noise powers are set to be 0 dBm.
In Figs. 3 and 4 , the SOP is depicted versus Alice's transmission power for different jamming signals power levels at Bob and John. In these two figures, we compare the SOPs of the DSHT-only mode, the RDHT-only mode, and our proposed adaptive transmission scheme. Our proposed adaptive scheme always outperforms the conventional systems (DSHT and RDHT) when both the jammer and the destination help in reducing the leakage rate to the untrusted relays. In fact, as the number of jamming nodes increases, more confusion is caused for the untrusted relays and more energy is harvested at the relays. As a result, the SOP decreases due to increased secrecy rates and the availability of more active relays. Moreover, due to the time-varying nature of wireless fading channels, the relay link may not be always better than the direct link and vice versa. The DSHT mode shows a good performance at high levels of P a while the RDHT mode is very promising for low-to-medium levels of P a . Clearly, the DSHT mode is better than the RDHT mode when the direct link is significantly stronger than the relaying link, while the RDHT mode will perform better when the direct link is relatively weak. Hence, a proper transmission mode selection scheme significantly enhances the system security, provided that perfect CSI is available at the control unit (e.g., Alice or Bob). Furthermore, as P a increases, the SOPs of our proposed scheme and the DSHT mode decrease, although the SOP of the RDHT mode first decreases and then increases. This is because, the data rate of the Alice-relay link decreases as P a decreases and, hence, Bob's jamming signal has more harmful impact on the relays. Accordingly, it becomes more difficult for the selected relay to successfully decode Alice's information signal. However, despite using the DBJ scheme, when P a is larger than P b , the data rate of the Alice-relay link may be higher than the direct link data rate which, in turn, increases the SOP. This reveals that the secrecy performance of the RDHT mode reduces when Alice uses a transmission power higher than Bob's jamming power P b .
The effect of the jamming power at the destination is investigated in Fig. 3 . The secrecy performance of the DSHT mode is independent of P b . However, when P b decreases, the SOP of the RDHT mode increases. Since the RDHT mode is frequently selected for low values of P a , the SOP of our proposed scheme increases as P b increases. Hence, when P a = 40 dBm, the direct link is strong enough to ensure the target secrecy rate R s without the help of the relay nodes. If P b = 0 (i.e., no jamming from Bob), since the selected relay for information forwarding r will have better channel to Bob than Alice, the achievable secrecy rate of the RDHT mode is zero. Hence, the RDHT mode will not be used at all and the system's SOP will be the same as that of DSHT mode. On the other hand, the effect of P J is shown in Fig. 4 where we observe that the SOP becomes high for the no-jamming cases for all schemes. Without jamming, the relay channel is better than the direct-link channel which leads to zero instantaneous secrecy rate through the use of the DSHT mode. Thus, Alice will always select the two-hop transmission mode where, for secrecy purpose, Bob ignores the direct link to transmit a jamming signal during the first phase. Figs. 5 and 6 show the SOP of our proposed scheme as a function of the x-coordinate of the relays and the x-coordinate of the cooperative jammer (John), denoted by x J . These two figures demonstrate that, according to the John's location, there are two limited areas where the relays could compromise the secrecy of the system. These areas are the ones where the relays are located close to Alice and Bob. We observe that for when the x-coordinate of the relay's location x r ≤ 0.3 (i.e., the relay is closer to the source) the SOP increases as John moves far away from the source and toward to the destination (i.e., x J grows). In fact, when John is far away from the untrusted relays, his jamming is less effective in improving the secrecy performance. For the RDHT mode, when x r decreases, the SOP increases. This is because, relays are supposed to be cooperative in forwarding the information from Alice but they are not trusted. Hence, to have secure communications, the relays should be closer to the source. On the other hand, when relays are close to the destination, the first-hop becomes the bottleneck for the dual-hop communications since the performance gain achieved from the second-hop is significantly higher. Moreover, when the relays are located far away from the source, the harvested energy at the relays becomes limited since the distance is high.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new AN-aided relay-selection scheme to secure a wireless-powered untrusted AF-relay network. We analyzed the systemâĂŹs secrecy rates and SOPs. We showed that our proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark schemes. We demonstrated that increasing the number of jamming nodes and jamming powers from the cooperative jammer or the destination node will increase the security of the transmissions as well as the amount of energy transferred to the relays; hence, they will be able to help the source's transmissions in more time slots. We showed that the security is more compromised when the relays are located close to Alice and Bob. That is, in the RDHT mode, when the relays are closer to Alice, the SOP increases since the relays are supposed to forward Alice's transmission but they are not trusted. Hence, to secure communications, the relays should be closer to Alice. On the other hand, when relays are close to Bob, the first-hop becomes the bottleneck for the dual-hop communications since the performance gain achieved from the second-hop is significantly higher. Moreover, when the relays are located far away from Alice, the harvested energy at the relays becomes limited due to the large distance. In addition, the SOP increases as John moves far away from Alice towards Bob. In fact, when John is far away from the untrusted relays, the impact of his jamming signal is low and less energy transfer occurs from John to the relays. Finally, we showed that for the RDHT-only scheme, there is an optimal transmit power level for Alice that minimizes the SOP.
